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The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices:  
Evidence from the Loi Galland 
Abstract 
In 1997, a new legislation banning below-invoice retail prices came into force in 
France. Individually negotiated discounts could no longer be passed on to consumers, 
which is equivalent to allowing industry-wide price ﬂoors. The anti-competitive effects 
of such practices are well-known. The elimination of intra-brand competition is 
expected to lead to a sharp increase in the retail prices. Using CPI raw data, we ﬁnd 
evidence supporting this claim. The modification or revocation of the existing 
legislation (as it has been done in Ireland in December 2005) would then be expected 
to reduce retail prices. 





Effets des régulations sur les prix du commerce  
de détail : exemple de la Loi Galland 
Résumé 
Entrée en application en 1997, la loi Galland interdit la revente en dessous du prix 
facturé. Les remises négociées individuellement (les « marges arrières ») ne peuvent 
plus être transmises aux consommateurs. Le seuil de revente à perte découle donc 
des conditions générales de ventes et s’apparente donc à un prix plancher sectoriel. 
Les effets anti-concurrentiels de ce type de pratiques sont bien connus. Une 
augmentation importante des prix de détail est attendue, suite à l'élimination de la 
concurrence intra-marques. L'analyse les données brute de l'Indices des Prix à la 
Consommation confirme cet effet. La modification ou l’abrogation de la législation 
actuelle (comme l'a fait l'Irlande en 2005) devraient donc avoir un effet à la baisse sur 
les prix de détail. 
Mots-clés : prix de détail, réglementation des prix, prix de revente imposés 
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Introduction
Vertical relationships between large food retailers and manufacturers have been recently at the
center of a ﬁerce debate in France. The starting point of that debate was the observation that
the average prices of food products had increased faster than the consumer price index over the
1997-2002 period (11.8% vs. 6.4%), whereas it tended to increase at a slower rate before 1997
(2% vs. 3% over the 1994-1996 period). This inﬂationary trend also seemed to be speciﬁc to
France where food prices increased signiﬁcantly more than in other Euro zone countries. The
common feeling was that the enactment of the 1996 Loi Galland banning below-invoice prices
had eliminated price competition between the main retail chains and caused this sharp price
increase. In 2004, a group of experts (Commission Canivet) was thus commissioned to evaluate
the existing legal framework. The title of their report (Commission Canivet 2005) on vertical
relationships in the food industry - “Restoring price competition” - was a clear indication of
what was expected from the discussions.
Come into force January 1997, the Loi Galland prevents – among other things – retailers
from reselling “below-cost”.1 Below-cost prices had been banned in France since 1963 but the
deﬁnition of the threshold was relatively unclear. The Loi Galland clearly deﬁned the price
below which retailers were not allowed to sell as the invoice price, that is, the price paid by the
retailer at the time of delivery. The important aspect of this deﬁnition is that it does not include
any anticipated rebates that are usually paid at the end of the year (e.g. quantity rebates) since
they are not included on the invoice. It is therefore impossible for retailers to pass such rebates
through to ﬁnal consumers which thus guarantees a minimum (gross) margin to the retailers.
Parties (manufacturers and retailers) seem to agree that, after the enactment of the Loi
Galland, the negotiation shifted from “upfront margins” (i.e. rebates that can be included on the
invoice) to “hidden margins” (i.e. end-of-year rebates and commercial cooperation that cannot
be passed through to consumers). According to the producer’s association ILEC, the average
hidden margin increased from 22% of the net wholesale price in 1998 to 32% in 2003. In some
(extreme) cases, rebates that parties knew in advance would be obtained by retailers and could
therefore have been included in invoices at the time of delivery, were negotiated as end-of-year
rebates. This had the eﬀect of removing eﬀective competition between participating retailers,
1The Loi Galland was introduced in order to “level the playing ﬁeld” between small businesses and the rapidly
growing chains of large retailers, mainly in the groceries sector.4
thereby leading to higher retail prices. In Buena Vista Home Entertainment (BVHE), the
French competition authority considered that some end-of-year rebates were falsely conditional
and ﬁned BVHE and some of its retailers e14.4 million.2
When the shift from upfront to hidden margins is pushed to the extreme (i.e. negotiating
hidden rebates only), the new law becomes equivalent to allowing price ﬂoors. Furthermore, the
“General Terms of Sales” published by producers are non-negotiable and cannot be discrimina-
tory. Therefore, the same price ﬂoor applies to all retailers. The below-invoice price law de facto
eliminated competition on the downstream market, thus leading to higher prices. This is indeed
consistent with the results of O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992) suggesting that industry-wide price
ﬂoors can allow a monopolist producer to solve its opportunism problem when selling to multiple
retailers. When (secretly) negotiating with a retailer, the producer internalizes the whole proﬁt
made by this retailer but not the retail margin of the competing retailers. It has incentives
to free-ride on the other retailers’ downstream margins and thus to lower the negotiated price.
This is anticipated by the retailers who are for this reason not willing to accept a high tariﬀ.
The equilibrium wholesale price is equal to the marginal production cost, thereby leading to
(relatively) competitive retail prices. An industry-wide minimum price ﬂoor then prevents the
producer from secretly oﬀering a better deal to a retailer since this has no impact on the retailer’s
sales, thus restoring monopoly prices and proﬁts. Perfectly in line with these arguments, the
experts of the Canivet working party proposed to eliminate the separation between upfront and
hidden margins, thus allowing retailers to pass all rebates through to consumers. This should
restore intrabrand competition, thereby leading to lower retail prices.
The empirical evidence on the eﬀect of the Loi Galland is scarce. Looking at the prices of
1500 (national brands) products sold by large retail chains, Nielsen found that retail prices
went up by more than 4% during the ﬁrst two months of 1997. On the contrary, the DGCCRF
(Ministry of Finance), considered all types of products – i.e. national brands, private labels and
low price products – and found an increase of only 0.5% during the same period. This paper
provides a ﬁrst general empirical test of the claims that the Galland Act, by de facto legalizing
(industry-wide) price ﬂoors, was indeed responsible for the increase in prices that occurred after
1997.
To our knowledge, the only empirical study of the eﬀects of below-cost pricing regulations was
done by Collins, Burt, and Oustapassidis (2001), who evaluate the eﬀect of such a law in Ireland.
Ireland indeed introduced an almost identical law in 1987 (Groceries Order).3 Focusing on a
2See Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision 05-D-70, December 2005.
3The 1987 Groceries Order has been revoked in December 2005. Very similar arguments to those used in
France were mentioned by the Irish Competition Authority in order to justify the decision: the Minister for5
speciﬁc category of products (processed and preserved fruits and vegetables), Collins, Burt, and
Oustapassidis (2001) show that the 1987 Groceries Order was a signiﬁcant variable in explaining
gross retail margins, and that the average retail margin increased from 15.8% in 1988 to 20.1% in
1993. Our approach is diﬀerent in that we do not consider retail margins but only retail prices.
We also take advantage of the richness of our dataset to focus on individual retail prices (rather
than a national index for a basket of products) for a large number of products (more than 100
diﬀerent categories). Although we cannot directly measure the increase in price due to the Loi
Galland, we can indirectly validate the theories of harm presented by the Canivet Commission
(among others).4 Although they are not primarily interested by below-cost pricing regulations,
Bonnet and Dubois (2007) analyze vertical contracting between manufacturers and retailers.
Using micro-level data on the distribution of bottled water in French supermarkets during the
1998-2001 period (panel of about 11000 French households), they test diﬀerent hypotheses on
the vertical relationships and the pricing strategies. Their empirical analysis suggests that
manufacturers use two-part tariﬀs combined with resale price maintenance. Given that their
dataset covers the period 1998-2001, these results are consistent with the theories claiming that
the Loi Galland de facto led to minimum resale price maintenance. They also simulate a counter-
factual experiment constraining wholesale contracts to two-part tariﬀs and show that this would
lead to a decrease in prices of major national brands of about 7%.
Finally, our paper is related to the growing literature linking market structure and prices. In
particular, we test whether the switch to retail prices imposed by the manufacturers has led to a
signiﬁcantly smaller link between retail prices and local market concentration. As some earlier
studies focusing on grocery prices, we ﬁnd that in the absence of resale price maintenance (i.e.
before 1997 reform), retail prices are positively correlated with concentration in local grocery
markets.5 However, after the reform, this correlation is no longer signiﬁcant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Empirical analysis is constrained by the available
data. Part of the paper’s contribution relies on the originality of our dataset. We thus start by
presenting our data (section 1). We then very brieﬂy review some relevant theoretical literature
on minimum resale price maintenance and derive some testable predictions (section 2). In section
3, we carry out an indirect test of the theory of harm presented in the introduction and look
at the correlation between retail prices and local markets concentration in 1994 and 1999. We
then take advantage of the panel dimension of our data to provide a more direct test of our
Enterprise, Trade and Development commented that the revocation would “introduce greater competition into
grocery trade by allowing retailers freedom to determine the prices they charge their customers.”
4See also Allain and Chambolle (2005, 2007) for theoretical papers on this speciﬁc issue.
5See Barros, Brito, and de Lucena (2006) for Portugal, Asplund and Friberg (2002) for Sweden, Marion (1998)
for the U.S.6
predictions. To achieve this, we construct individual store eﬀects and show that prices increased
more in stores that were initially lower (section 4). Section 5 concludes.
1 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper is mainly based on two datasets, one on retail prices and
one on the local structure of the grocery retailing sector.
1.1 Retail Prices
We have been granted access to a unique database on individual retail prices, collected by INSEE
(the French national institute of statistics) to compute the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This
database being the basis for the CPI, it covers the whole of the national territory. Stores and
products surveyed are sampled to ensure representativeness.
The products for which prices are collected are coded according to a classiﬁcation speciﬁc
to the CPI. We decided to retain only the products that are suﬃciently homogeneous across
stores and dates (e.g. sugar, milk). We thus exclude intrinsically heterogeneous products such
as clothes or furniture. We also further restrict our sample by selecting only products that
are widely distributed across all types of retailers. Our dataset includes prices for 141 food
items and 45 non-food items in 1994 (147 and 46 in 1999). Almost all products in our sample
were surveyed in hypermarkets, supermarkets and magasins populaires. More than 88% of these
products were surveyed in convenience stores and more than 44% in hard discounts (mainly food
items).
Although, characteristics such as brand can change from one store to the other or from one
date to another, our data also include a variable for the brand name. Unfortunately, since
this information is either missing, or not very informative for most of the observations, it is
impossible for us to use it: for instance, we are not able to satisfactorily distinguish between
national brands and private labels.
Prices for a given product in a given store are surveyed every month. Whenever a store is
shut down, it is replaced in the sample by a similar store within the same area. In practice,
the retail price of product i in store j at time t is collected by an INSEE employee visiting the
store and recording the price as well as other relevant information (such as brand, whether the
product was part of a promotion, ...).
For each store in which at least one price is collected, data include the city administrative7
code. We will use this code to match the retail price data with data about the local market
(see below). The data also include the fascia of the store. Unfortunately, this information is not
recorded every month but only when the store is included in the sample for the ﬁrst time. It
is not updated when the fascia changes, therefore the matching of fascias with data on grocery
stores is quite imperfect.
General terms of sales are negotiated on a yearly basis. Besides, the Loi Galland induces
a fundamental change in the framework of bilateral negotiations. Thus, we do not expect the
eﬀects of the Loi Galland to be fully eﬀective just after the enactment. Important mergers take
place in year 2000 in the French retailing industry. As a result, we use a monthly panel covering
the period 01/1994 to 12/1999, where the statistical unit followed over time is product i in store
j.
1.2 Grocery Stores
The local structure of the groceries retail market is provided by a unique dataset constructed by
the authors using the “Atlas de la grande distribution”, a yearly national index of grocery stores.
This index is used as reference by the retailers themselves and is, in principle, exhaustive.
Stores can be classiﬁed according to type and size (measured by selling area). All stores
within a type category by and large follow the same business model. The various types (“formes
de vente”) are:
• Hypermarkets are large stores (selling area over 2500m2) generally located at the pe-
riphery of large cities.
• Supermarkets have selling area between 400 and 2500m2 and usually located in city
centers or at the periphery of smaller cities.
• Convenience Stores have selling area smaller than 400m2 and are located closer to the
customers.
• Hard-discounters can have sizes comparable to that of supermarkets or convenience
stores. However, they do not sell the same range of products (usually do not oﬀer the
leading brands) and do not propose the same services.
• “Magasins Populaires” are the traditional multipurpose stores in city centers. They
have sizes comparable to that of supermarkets, but do not primarily focus on food items.8
We have collected data for all stores above 120m2 for 1994 and 1999 (stocks of stores are
evaluated at the start of the year). For each store, information includes variables such as type
(as deﬁned above), size (selling area in m2), fascia and location (administrative city code).6
We do not have more precise information about the exact location in a city, except for the
three largest cities (Paris, Marseille and Lyon) for which the “Arrondissement” (i.e. district) is
known.7 Table 1 shows the number of stores (for the various types described above) in both our
retail price (CPI data) and grocery stores (store data) datasets.
Table 1 : Number of stores
Hyper Super Hard Discount Convenience Magasin Pop.
1994
Store Data 1001 5947 750 n/a 292
CPI Data 364 780 79 560 130
1999
Store Data 1120 5806 2164 n/a 307
CPI Data 495 832 173 355 136
Sources: INSEE (IPC), LSA
1.3 Catchment Areas and Proxies for Local Competition
Downstream competition in the retail industry takes place locally. Delineating geographical
relevant markets is however an issue in itself. For the sake of simplicity, we construct catchment
areas around each store within our CPI dataset. Our approach is similar to Barros, Brito, and
de Lucena (2006) and consistent with assessment of the European Commission in the Kesko /
Tuko and Carrefour / Promod` es merger cases. Given that we do not know the exact location
of a store but only the city code, a catchment area will be centered around cities rather than
stores. All stores within one particular city code will therefore have the same catchment area.
To construct these catchment areas, we use an INSEE dataset providing cartesian coordinates
of city barycenters. For any city within the CPI sample, we use these coordinates to compute
its distance (as the crow ﬂies) to neighboring cities. We then ﬁx a maximum distance, usually
10km, to identify the cities that will be included in a catchment area.8
6Administrative city code is slightly diﬀerent from ZIP-Codes: it tends to be more precise for small and
medium size cities (some ZIP-codes can include several towns or villages that have separate city codes) but is less
precise for larger cities (that can have several ZIP-codes but have a unique city code).
7Paris, Marseille and Lyon have 20, 16 and 9 Arrondissements respectively.
8Alternative distances of 2.5, 5 and 20km have been used as robustness checks. Distances between cities is
to be understood as between city centers. Hence, distances between neighboring cities will be strictly positive.
In our sample, the median of the distance to the closest city is 2.5km. When we take a distance of 2.5km as a
reference to deﬁne our catchment areas, at least half of these areas are reduced to one city.9
Using our store dataset, we then list stores (and selling area) within each catchment area.9
As in Barros, Brito, and de Lucena (2006), our proxies for local competition are then measures
of local concentration. These indices (hereafter market concentration, MC) are based on selling
area and are built as an Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index based on selling area rather than turnover
or quantities: it is simply the sum of the squared market shares (expressed in terms of selling
area).
Table 2 : Distribution of surrounding stores
Hyper Super Hard Discount Magasin Pop.
1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999
0 km
Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Med. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Q3 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 0
P90 1 1 4 3 1 3 1 1
5 km
Q1 1 1 3 3 0 1 0 0
Med. 2 2 6 6 1 4 0 0
Q3 3 3 14 13 3 8 1 1
P90 7 7 43 21 7 23 9 9
10 km
Q1 2 2 7 7 1 4 0 0
Med. 4 4 18 18 3 9 1 1
Q3 7 8 37 34 8 20 2 2
P90 18 17 74 67 13 42 14 13
20 km
Q1 3 4 19 18 3 6 1 1
Med. 7 8 41 39 7 20 1 1
Q3 15 17 75 72 17 44 6 5
P90 56 55 396 365 57 223 81 85
Sources: INSEE (IPC), LSA, computations by the authors.
Choices have to be made as regards the size of the catchment areas. Increasing the size of the
market, either in terms of distance or of scope of stores, allows to better account for all stores
that may impose a competitive constraint. However, we also risk to loose some variability, since
we are then bound to include stores that are not relevant. Table 2 shows the distribution of the
number of stores (excluding convenience stores) surrounding the stores appearing in the CPI
dataset (including convenience stores). It shows that these stores are seldom in competition with
stores in the same city. Thus, the market should not be too narrowly deﬁned. Besides, although
hypermarkets are likely to attract consumers traveling longer distances, convenience stores are
9So far, we have excluded convenience stores. We indeed believe that our store dataset is exhaustive for the
largest stores and convenience stores that belong to national chains, but in general does not include smaller
independent corner stores.10
more likely to attract only local consumers. It is thus preferable to select an intermediate
distance as a reference. We thus decided to focus on two speciﬁcations.10 First, we build our
concentration index including all stores (except convenience stores) within a 10km range. As
an alternative, we also build up catchment areas including all “magasins populaires” within
5km, all supermarkets and hard discounters within 10km, and all hypermarkets within 20km.
Our deﬁnition of catchment area is therefore slightly more restrictive than those used in other
studies of local competition.11 However, we believe that this is a more reasonable choice since
our sample does not include only large stores (such as hypermarkets or big supermarkets) but
also some smaller convenience stores.
Finally, we use the 1999 Census data as proxies for local demand. Variables used to charac-
terize each catchment area include local population as well as information on household income
(percentage of households paying income tax, average reported income). Table 3 summarizes
some statistics on our sample.
Table 3 : Summary Statistics
MC (10 km) MC (5/10/20 km) Population (log) a Income (log) a
1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999
Q1 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 11.82 11.45 11.35 11.36
Median 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 12.48 12.44 11.46 11.46
Mean 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 12.46 12.35 11.46 11.47
Q3 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 13.25 13.25 11.53 11.54
P90 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23 14.38 14.16 11.67 11.71
STD 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 1.37 1.42 0.18 0.17
# Obs. 25994 20243 25994 20243 25994 20243 25994 20243
a: data on population are time invariant and come from the 1999 census. However, the samples for both
cross section marginally diﬀer and so do the summary statistics. Sources: INSEE (IPC), LSA, computations
by the authors.
2 Theoretical Predictions
In order to understand the inﬂationary mechanism put forward during the discussions about the
eﬀects of the Loi Galland, it is important to understand how actual wholesale and retail prices
are formed. Every year (usually in late autumn), producers announce their “general terms of
sale” (hereafter GTS). According to the current laws, the GTS have to be non-discriminatory
10Our results are however robust to many other speciﬁcations. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations as regards to stores that
should be included in the “local markets” (i.e. catchment areas) have been tried, including all stores, hypermarkets
and supermarkets only or solely hypermarkets, with various distances.
11For instance Barros, Brito, and de Lucena use a distance of 30kms but focus on very large stores only.11
and are non-negotiable.12 The GTS usually specify a wholesale price schedule (the “tariﬀ price”)
and quantity rebates or channel speciﬁc rebates (or free units for instance) that are included on
the invoice at the time of purchase. This deﬁnes the “net wholesale price”, which, under the Loi
Galland, constitutes the minimum price (the invoice price) below which retailers cannot sell.
The GTS can also include rebates that are not mentioned on the invoice at the time of
purchase but are usually paid at the end of the year.13 These rebates are often linked to
the annual quantity ordered by the retailer. The “double net wholesale price” includes these
rebates. Finally, a producer and a retail chain often negotiate additional rebates for speciﬁc
services oﬀered by the retailer to the manufacturer (such as promotional activities, better shelf
space, local advertising, ...). These services are billed separately and normally on a yearly basis.
Once these rebates are included, the wholesale price actually paid by the retailer is referred to
as the “triple net price.” The diﬀerence between the net and triple net prices is often called
“hidden” or “backward” margin (or hidden rebates).
Under normal circumstances, the resale below-cost laws should deﬁne the threshold as the
triple net price. Under the Loi Galland, the hidden rebates cannot be passed on to ﬁnal con-
sumers and thus constitute a guaranteed (gross) margin for the retailer. Combined with the
non-discriminatory laws, this regulation thus has the same eﬀect as legalizing industry-wide
price ﬂoors.
2.1 Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
In the context of vertical relationships between a monopolist producer and competing retailers,
it has been shown that industry-wide price ﬂoors can be used to restore the ability of the vertical
structure to maintain high prices. This not only harms the consumers but also reduces total
economic welfare. This issue was analyzed by O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992) who show that, without
price ﬂoors, a manufacturer is tempted to free-ride on its retailers when vertical contracts are
privately negotiated and not publicly observed; as a result, wholesale prices are equal to marginal
costs and retail prices are rather competitive. This “opportunism problem” thus prevents the
manufacturer from fully exerting its market power. This issue is very similar to that ﬁrst
analyzed by Hart and Tirole (1990) in the context of quantity competition. In this context,
even without alternative upstream manufacturer, intrabrand competition, i.e. between retailers
who sell the exact same good, is suﬃcient to generate relatively competitive equilibriums. Due
12Although GTS have to be non-discriminatory, they can still diﬀer across distribution channels (e.g. GTS for
hypermarkets, GTS for supermarkets, GTS for convenience stores) or be global but include speciﬁc terms (e.g.
rebates) for a speciﬁc channel.
13Products are usually delivered to retail chains distribution platforms – and thus billed – several times a year.12
to the vertical coordination problem, it is the downstream market structure who drives the retail
price.
When negotiating the wholesale contract, a retailer and the manufacturer take the contracts
oﬀered to competing distributors as given and therefore do not internalize the retail margins on
those products. In each secret negotiation, the manufacturer is then tempted to free-ride on the
other retailers’ sales. Deviations would induce externalities on the other retailers, who would
face a lower demand, as the other retailers would behave more aggressively. Quite intuitively,
this “opportunity problem” can be solved in two diﬀerent ways. First, eliminating retail margins
eliminates the incentive to free-ride. It can be done by setting the bilaterally negotiated retail
and wholesale prices, as well as a price ceiling (and not price ﬂoors), equal to the monopoly
price.
Second, price ﬂoors can nevertheless be used to solve the opportunism problem as long as the
manufacturer is required to set the same price ﬂoor for all retailers (industry-wide price ﬂoor).
This would eliminate the externalities on the other retailers from a deviation in a secret negoti-
ation. Suppose for instance that the manufacturer sets a price ﬂoor equal to the monopoly price
and wholesale prices equal to its marginal cost (and uses franchise fees to share the monopoly
proﬁt with the retailers). In a secret negotiation, the producer can no longer lower the price set
by the negotiating retailer and thus the sales of the various retailers. In this context, a credible
price ﬂoor common to all retailers is a credible commitment device for the producer. 14
Allain and Chambolle (2005) use a similar framework to speciﬁcally analyze the eﬀects of
the Loi Galland. In particular, the formation of wholesale prices is assumed to take place in
two diﬀerent stages: the manufacturer ﬁrst announces a (public) non-discriminatory wholesale
price (corresponding to the General Terms of Sales), then the manufacturer and each retailer
bilaterally negotiate (individualized) rebates. If two-part rebates (ﬁxed fees and discount on
the unit price) can be negotiated, their model is almost identical to that of O’Brien and Shaﬀer
(1992), except for the fact that retailers might have some bargaining power: this does not aﬀect
the determination of retail prices but only proﬁt sharing rules. Allowing the manufacturer
to impose an industry-wide price ﬂoor thus eliminates any opportunism problem and restores
monopoly prices. The situation is slightly diﬀerent when wholesale tariﬀs can only be linear.
In that case, an industry-wide price ﬂoor will be used to maintain high retail prices when
the retailers’ relative bargaining strength is high. Allain and Chambolle (2007) also allow for
14The opportunism problem faced by the monopolist producer is very similar to the inter-temporal pricing
problem faced by a durable good monopolist. It has also been explored by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and
Rey and Verg´ e (2004a) using a more standard equilibrium concept (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) rather than the
contract equilibrium concept ` a la Cremer and Riordan (1987) used by O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992). See also Rey
and Tirole (2007) for an overview of this literature.13
interbrand competition and obtain a very similar result. Once again, the eﬀect of a price ﬂoor
common to all retailers is unambiguously positive when wholesale contracts include ﬁxed fees
on the top of the (constant) unit prices.
Biscourp, Boutin, and Verge (2008) study a bilateral duopoly with interlocking relationships
similar to that of Allain and Chambolle (2007) but allow for endogenous market structure.
The main diﬀerence between the two approaches relates to the equilibrium concept. To reﬂect
diﬀerent bargaining powers, Allain and Chambolle assume that hidden margins (rebates) are
determined by simultaneous pairwise bargaining, which supposes that a manufacturer has two
independent divisions, each of them negotiating with one retailer not taking into account the
impact of its own negotiation on the other division. In contrast, Biscourp, Boutin, and Verge
(2008) introduce an explicit dynamic multilateral framework: this is similar to the approach of
de Fontenay and Gans (2005) who use Stole and Zwiebel’s (1996) model of sequential bilateral
bargaining, with renegotiation (“from scratch”) in a case a relationship breaks-down.15 As in
de Fontenay and Gans (2005) or O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992), wholesale contracts are bilater-
ally eﬃcient. Therefore, introducing an industry-wide price ﬂoor will again remove intrabrand
competition and, for a given market structure, lead to higher retail prices. Moreover, since it
aﬀects the proﬁtability of each product, the price ﬂoor may also aﬀect the equilibrium market
structure. In the bilateral duopoly model with interlocking relationship, an industry-wide price
ﬂoor guarantees that both brands with be available on both retailers’ shelves. In the absence
of such price ﬂoor, some products will be missing when intrabrand competition is too ﬁerce. In
that case, each retailer only carries one brand. Retail prices for the available product are lower
than under the price ﬂoor regime, however, consumer surplus may be lower since some products
are now missing. An industry-wide price ﬂoor may then be welfare-enhancing, however, this
impact would tend to be relatively limited since it occurs when brand are highly substitutable.
Because our data does not include any information on the sets of products that are available on
the retailers’ shelves, we will not be able to estimate the full impact of the Loi Galland but will
only consider its impact on the prices of available products.
All the models presented above rely on the assumption that the price ﬂoor set by a manufac-
turer is common to all retailers. When contracts are secrets, this assumption is essential since
it is the only way to commit not to secretly oﬀer a better deal (i.e. a lower price ﬂoor) to the
rival retailers. This assumption is no longer necessary when wholesale contracts are observable.
Like Allain and Chambolle (2007), Dobson and Waterson (2007) study bilateral duopoly
with interlocking relationships and assume that manufacturers use (observable) linear wholesale
15Bedre (2007) considers a similar setting but assuming that wholesale contracts are observable.14
prices. They show that the welfare eﬀects of RPM depend on the relative degree of upstream
and downstream diﬀerentiation as well as on retailers’ and manufacturers’ bargaining powers;
RPM is shown to be socially harmful when retailers are in a strong bargaining position, because
the double-marginalization problems generated by the restriction to linear wholesale prices are
less severe in such circumstances.
In order to eliminate double marginalization problems and focus instead on the impact of
RPM on interbrand and intrabrand competition, Rey and Verg´ e (2004b) allow manufacturers
to use (eﬃcient) two-part wholesale tariﬀs. RPM is then shown to be unambiguously harmful
when (i) either the manufacturers have the bargaining power and there is no retail bottleneck,
or (ii) retailers have the bargaining power and there is no supplier bottleneck.
Overall, even if the models are simpler with an upstream monopoly, the previous models with
bilateral duopolies show that the existence of interbrand competition does not eliminate the
opportunism problem and thus the anticompetitive potentials of RPM. However, these models
are likely to be irrelevant if there exist a very large number of small upstream ﬁrms. First, these
small ﬁrms are unlikely to sell to many retailers (otherwise, they would not be small). Second,
they are likely to be very substitutable and would make near to zero proﬁts. For these two
reasons, they are unlikely to be strategic actors. Then, opportunism is not an issue, nor RPM.
As a consequence, these ﬁrms would not be aﬀected by the Loi Galland.
At last, ﬁerce intrabrand competition can reduce retailers’ incentives to provide pre-sales
services to consumers. Price ﬂoors used to solve this problem might be beneﬁcial to consumers
and total welfare, despite leading to higher retail prices.16 However, this requires that consumers
are uninformed about the product’s characteristics and that potential gains (from lower prices)
exceed additional transportation costs. This is irrelevant for groceries, where consumers favor
one-stop shopping strategies for their repeated purchases.
These theoretical models all suggest that the Loi Galland could have been responsible for
the increase in prices that has been observed in France after 1997. This increase could also
have been explained by increases in production or distribution costs. The price increase would
however be very diﬀerent in these two possible scenarii. The eﬀect of an industry-wide price
ﬂoor comes from the elimination of intrabrand competition which is not aﬀected by a change in
costs. On the contrary, in the absence of price ﬂoors, retail prices are expected to respond to
competition between retailers in each local market.
First, we expect some positive correlation between retail prices and our measure of concen-
16See Telser (1960). Rey and Verg´ e (2008) provide a recent survey of the eﬀects of resale price maintenance.15
tration (described in the previous section), which acts as a proxy for the degree of competition
in local grocery markets. This correlation should disappear (or at least be strongly reduced),
after 1997. Note that a change in costs would not aﬀect this correlation.
Moreover, on a given local market, hypermarkets (selling area over 2500 m2) compete with
supermarkets (selling area between 400 and 2500 m2), convenience stores (selling area less than
400m2) and hard-discount stores. However, these diﬀerent formats do not necessarily face the
same demand: less elastic demand for convenience stores and supermarkets located in city
centers, low income consumers for hard-discount stores. Inner city consumers face the choice
between local retailers, at walkable distance, and large hypermarkets, located at the outskirts
of the city. Among the local retailers, they will strongly favor the closest. Inner city retailers
are thus very diﬀerentiated for consumers. On the contrary, driving times are less important.
We thus expect competition to be ﬁercer between hypermarkets. As a result, the impact of the
Loi Galland should have been larger for these stores.
At last, hard-discount stores do not often sell branded products and thus would not have seen
changes in the terms oﬀered by their suppliers. Therefore, the price increase should have been
very limited for this format since it would only be a response (positive if we assume that prices
are strategic complements) to the increase in prices of rival formats.17
2.2 National Negotiations and Local Pricing Strategies
The theoretical arguments presented above suggest that intrabrand competition should have
been totally eliminated by the enactment of the Loi Galland. In practice, the situation is
probably less extreme for several reasons.
First, the “general terms of sales” and the various rebates are negotiated at the national
level between a manufacturer and the buying group of a given chain. Large retail chains usually
have a unique buying group – or purchasing unit – for the whole chain that might include
several “fascias” or brands. Retail prices are however set locally and depend on the local
market conditions. Therefore, the minimum retail price implicitly set by the manufacturer is
a nationwide-price based on average market conditions and might not be binding everywhere.
Markets that initially had relatively high prices – either because of local demand conditions or
of high concentration – are thus unlikely to be aﬀected by the Galland Act. On the contrary,
markets where prices were initially lower have been aﬀected by the new minimum price and
17Given that the period we looked at also corresponds to the development of the hard-discount format in France,
it might even be the case that hard-discount prices went down during that period.16
prices thus went up in these markets. Therefore the inﬂationary impact should to have been
higher on markets where prices were initially relatively low.
2.3 Ban on Below-Invoice Prices or Planning Regulations?
A second law that was passed at almost the same as the Loi Galland. Introduced in July 1996,
the Loi Raﬀarin reinforces planning restrictions, reducing the threshold for a mandatory retail
permit (obtained through a lengthy administrative procedure) from 1000 to 300 sq meters. Some
observers have argued that the Loi Raﬀarin was also responsible for the retail price inﬂation
since retailers were no longer threatened by potential entry in their local markets.
However, we have several reasons to believe that the eﬀects that our empirical analysis high-
lights are not aﬀected by the change in planning regulations.
First, barriers to entry were already in place since the 1973 Loi Royer for large stores: the Loi
Royer introduced the mandatory retail permit for stores over 1000 sq. meters, i.e. hypermarkets
and most supermarkets. This law has been shown to have had signiﬁcant eﬀects on prices and
job creation in the groceries sector (see Bertrand and Kramarz 2002). Moreover, in 1993, the
Finance Minister gave instructions to the local commissions granting these retail permits to slow
down the evaluation process (see Askenazy and Weidenfeld 2007). This led to a signiﬁcant drop
in the number of store extensions and openings after 1993. The Loi Raﬀarin was merely seen as
a way to legalize that practice. Since our data covers a period starting in 1994, we thus expect
the impact of the Loi Raﬀarin to have been rather limited.
Second, opening a new store is a complex process that can take years, whereas retail prices
can be adjusted daily. It is thus very unlikely that retailers were unable to take advantage of
their market power because of the threat of entry before 1996. Moreover, even if this were to
be the case, retail prices (pre-1997) would not be correlated with current market concentration
since only potential concentration should matter. Thus, our results on this correlation in 1994
(see below) does not support contestable market theories.
3 Cross-Section Inﬂuence of Market Concentration
We expect the correlation between prices, local concentration and proxies for demand to have
decreased after the enactment of the Loi Galland. We now turn to empirical tests of this pre-
diction. Local concentration experiences little variation between 1994 and 1999. Hence, there
is no suﬃcient source of variation to identify the price - concentration correlation using ﬁrst17
diﬀerences. We then have to rely on cross-sectional estimations, run for 1994 and 1999. As local
concentration is available yearly, we aggregate our monthly available price at year level.18
For each date, we estimate a reduced-form price equation for product p in store s (of fascia
f(s) and type ty(s), in city c(s)):
log(Pt
p,s) = cstt + βt
MC.MCt
c(s) | {z }
local concen-
tration in c(s)





























Data for 1994 and 1999 are pooled so as to run a single regression allowing to test for dif-
ferences in coeﬃcients across years. Data for catchment areas include our measure of market
concentration, as well as overall population and wealth, all constructed at several levels of mar-
ket aggregation.19 We also control for the types of stores. Despite the large number of control
variables, this regression still omits unobserved determinants of prices that might also impact
market concentration. Estimates of βt
MC might thus be biased. As usual, cross section regres-
sions provide valuable insights into variable relationships, but do not lend themselves easily to
causal analysis. However, if the bias due to the endogeneity of local concentration is constant
over time, the changes in coeﬃcients can be attributed to the Loi Galland, and the diﬀerence
between the coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the causal impact of Loi Galland. This test will
indicate if correlation has decreased during the provided, which provides a ﬁrst way of checking
if the prediction is supported by the data.
Table 4 shows the results of cross-section regressions for 1994 and 1999, for two diﬀerent
constructions of local markets. All stores within a 10 km range are included in the ﬁrst set
of regressions. In the “5/10/20” treatment, hypermarkets up to 20 km were included, a well
as supermarkets and hard discounters up to 10 km and all other stores up to 5 km. For each
set, the ﬁrst column provides the coeﬃcient in 1994, while the second shows results for 1999.
Regressions for both years are done simultaneously so that it is possible to test for diﬀerences
in the coeﬃcients across years.
18We expect prices to be correlated within markets, given that we imperfectly control for catchment area
speciﬁcs. Thus, we use robust variances estimates clustered at town level for inference.
19Population and wealth come from the 1999 Census, and do not vary over time.18
Table 4 : Local Concentration and Prices in 1994 and 1999
10 km 5/10/20 km
1994 1999 1994 1999
Supermarket
0.056∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hard discount
-0.363∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
Convenience
0.223∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Magasin Populaire
0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Hypermarket ref. ref. ref. ref.
Market population (log)
0.026∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Market income (log)
0.027∗∗ 0.018 0.027∗∗ 0.019∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Market concentration
0.153∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037)
Product Dummies Y Y Y Y
Number of obs. 44051 44051
Note: Robust OLS estimators clustered by towns. R-squared : 0.997. In parenthesis: standard errors.
3, 2 and 1 stars respectively mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Not reported :
year dummies by product. Sources : INSEE (IPC,CENSUS), LSA. The “market” includes all stores within
10km in the “10 km”’ treatment. It includes hypermarkets up to 20km, supermarkets and hard discounters
up to 10 km and all other stores up to 5 km in the “5/10/20” treatment.
As far as market concentration is concerned, the results are striking. In 1994, prices are quite
intuitively higher when local market concentration is higher. We use an Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
local market concentration indicator.20 Therefore, for stores located in perfectly concentrated
markets, prices are 15% higher than for stores located in densely equipped areas. Stores lo-
cated in areas more concentrated of one standard deviation of our concentration index were
more expensive by about 1.5% in 1999. There results are quite in line with previous compa-
rable cross-section estimates for other European countries. For instance, Barros, Brito, and
de Lucena (2006) use data on the Portuguese grocery retail industry and ﬁnd that prices are
15% higher in extremely concentrated areas than in perfectly competitive areas (a change of
a standard error would lead to an increase of 1%). Asplund and Friberg (2002) ﬁnd smaller,
but comparable, ﬁgures for the Swedish market. The shortcomings of cross section regressions
when it comes to causal analysis have been emphasized above. However, if the point estimate
20By construction this indicator belongs to the interval ]0,1], as it is computed as the sum of squared sales
surfaces. It measures the concentration of sales surfaces but may also be interpreted as a proxy for concentrations
of sales.19
in year 1994 should be interpreted with caution, the comparison with the same estimates for
1999 is striking. Three years after the enactment of Galland Act, there is almost no correlation
remaining between prices and concentration, even though the structures of markets have only
marginally been altered between 1994 and 1999. This result is not sensitive to the deﬁnition of
local markets, as shown by table 4.
Our results also conﬁrm the commonly shared opinion that, conditional on product and local
market characteristics, hard discounters are by far the cheapest type of stores, before hypermar-
kets, supermarkets and convenience stores, magasins populaires lying somewhere in-between. In
terms of evolutions, the average diﬀerences in prices between hypermarkets, convenience stores
and magasins populaires has been stable on the period. Compared to hypermarkets, supermar-
kets were less expensive in 1999 than in 1994. On the contrary, the spread between prices in
hard-discounts and in hypermarkets increased during the period. Even though this assumption
is to be conﬁrmed by a dedicated analysis (in section 4), both facts are consistent with our pre-
dictions that prices would have converged to the most expensive values: supermarkets are more
expensive than hypermarkets, and hard-discounts are not directly aﬀected by the Loi Galland.
Finally, our results suggest that the inﬂuence of market population, which is a measure for popu-
lation density, also decreased during the period.21 The fact that prices are positively correlated
with population density, for a given market concentration, may be the consequence of many
unobserved characteristics, such as higher transportation costs for customers due to congestion,
higher quality, or higher land prices. The decrease in this correlation during such a short period
is consistent with a uniformization of prices due to Galland Act.22
These results are robust to further changes in speciﬁcation, in particular to the introduction
of fascia dummies. Stores sharing the same fascias most of the time also have the same type.
Adding fascia dummies to the regression with type dummies raises identiﬁcations issues and
makes the interpretation of both sets of coeﬃcients diﬃcult. However, controlling for fascias
might be important as regards to the consistence of the other coeﬃcients as fascias might also
be important determinants of prices. Results are given in table 5. It shows that the previous
results on the diﬀerences of coeﬃcients are very robust to this speciﬁcation.
21The size of the catchment areas are ﬁxed, and the logarithm of total population is hence a proxy for population
density.
22These catchment area characteristics are time invariant and are 1999 values. This can only reinforce our
results since we should expect the 1999 coeﬃcient to be more precisely estimated than the 1994 coeﬃcient.20
Table 5 : Local Concentration and Prices in 1994 and 1999
10 km 5/10/20 km
1994 1999 1994 1999
Market population (log)
0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Market income (log)
0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Market concentration
0.103∗∗∗ 0.018 0.138∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.031)
Product Dummies Y Y Y Y
Type Dummies Y Y Y Y
Fascia Dummies Y Y Y Y
Number of obs. 41877 41877
Note: Robust OLS estimators clustered by towns. R squared : 0.997. In parenthesis: standard errors.
3, 2 and 1 stars respectively mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Not reported
: year dummies by product, year dummies by type and fascia. Sources : INSEE (IPC,CENSUS), LSA.
The “market” includes all stores within 10km in the “10 km”’ treatment. It includes hypermarkets up to
20km, supermarkets and hard discounters up to 10 km and all other stores up to 5 km in the “5/10/20”
treatment.
Table 6 shows the results for prices in hypermarkets only.23 In 1994, coeﬃcients for local
concentration are larger for both sets of estimates, compared to these for the whole population
in table 5. The sample has also been dramatically reduced and estimates are less precise.
For the two deﬁnitions of local markets, the diﬀerence is larger for hypermarkets than for the
whole population, conﬁrming that hypermarkets have an inﬂuence on, and are inﬂuenced by,
hypermarkets located further apart. Overall, our results suggest that the enactment of Loi
Galland had the same inﬂuence on the larger stores of our sample, with a larger magnitude
since they were initially more receptive to local competition.
4 Long-Term Price Increase
The cross-sectional approach, although providing valuable insights into the eﬀects of the Loi
Galland, must be complemented by a more direct test of our predictions, taking advantage of
the panel dimension of our data.
As mentioned earlier, we expect retail prices to have increased more in stores where they
23Several other robustness checks were implemented, using prices of hypermarkets and supermarkets only
or alternative indicators of local concentration, including some types of stores only - e.g. supermarkets and
hypermarkets only. All the results are consistent with those presented in this paper.21
Table 6 : Local Concentration and Prices in 1994 and 1999
Hypermarkets only
10 km 5/10/20 km
1994 1999 1994 1999
Market population (log)
0.019∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Market income (log)
0.005 0.016 0.004 0.017
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Market concentration
0.160∗∗∗ 0.035 0.222∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.070) (0.053) (0.068) (0.063)
Product Dummies Y Y Y Y
Fascia Dummies Y Y Y Y
Number of obs. 15570 15570
Note: Robust OLS estimators clustered by towns. R squared : 0.997. In parenthesis: standard errors.
3, 2 and 1 stars respectively mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Not reported :
year dummies by product, year dummies by fascia. Sources : INSEE (IPC,CENSUS), LSA. The “mar-
ket” includes all stores within 10km in the “10 km”’ treatment. It includes hypermarkets up to 20km,
supermarkets and hard discounters up to 10 km and all other stores up to 5 km in the “5/10/20” treatment.
were initially lower. In the cross-sectional approach, we have been running regressions of prices
on their determinants, such as market concentration, and comparing the correlation of cross-
sectional price with market concentration before and after the implementation of the Loi Galland.
In order to obtain a more direct test, we now want to run a regression of price growth on initial
price, controlling for various determinants of price growth over the period, such as the change
in market concentration.
Implementing this approach requires great care, in order to avoid biases due to “regression
to the mean”. To illustrate this, assume for simplicity that prices are determined as the sum
of a stationary value and some stochastic shock, Pt = P∗ + εt. The shock may be the results
of measurement error or idiosyncratic supply and/or demand shocks. If εt is white noise, it is
easily seen that cov(Pt−Pt−1,Pt−1) = −var(εt). Because of the correlation between unobserved
determinants of price growth and initial price, we expect a negative correlation between price
growth and initial price. In other words, initial price may be endogenous in the regression we
want to run, and the parameter of interest may thus be biased toward negative values.
Before presenting our strategy to deal with this potential endogeneity issue, we ﬁrst discuss
the nature of shocks that can arise in the context of our empirical analysis. Unobserved shocks
aﬀecting prices may arise at diﬀerent levels.22
• At product level: Random price variations for a given product in a given store can
arise due to special oﬀers. Special oﬀers can be determined on an inventory rotation basis,
when demand is itself random. If so, items on special oﬀer in a given month of 1994 are
likely to be cheaper than the same product in another store at the same moment, but
unlikely to be on special oﬀer again during the same month of 1999. This kind of random
variation generates regression to the mean. Special oﬀers on popular items or brands can
also correspond to a strategy of stores aiming to attract customers. If special oﬀers are
determined on a rotation basis within a set of popular items, regression to the mean may
arise. Aggregating data at year and store level provides a simple way of eliminating or, at
least mitigating, this problem.
• At store level: Store level prices may experience random short term variation due to
idiosyncratic shocks of supply and/or demand. A store may for instance face unusually
high demand if a music festival happens to take place in the neighborhood. Aggregating
data at store level does not help in this case, and endogeneity must therefore be dealt with
in a diﬀerent way. A ﬁrst way of alleviating the problem of regression to the mean consists
in replacing the initial price Pt−1 by an average of past prices, computed over as many
dates as possible in order to smooth out shocks. This may not be suﬃcient as our sample
only allows us to use three dates previous to the Loi Galland. We thus complement this
approach by an instrumental variable strategy, whereby we instrument the averaged out
initial price by initial market concentration.
• At regional level: Some regions (e.g., the more industrial ones) may be more sensitive to
macroeconomic cycles. The year 1994 corresponds to the end of a recession, whereas 1999
corresponds to the top of a cycle. More sensitive regions will thus have larger aggregate
variations in demand between 1999 and 1994 than the less sensitive ones. We already
control for income; however, this may not be suﬃcient. We thus include regional dummies
in our regressions to control for this source of regression to the mean.24
Before turning to the empirical test, we describe and discuss the aggregation process of prices
at the store level, which allows us to construct our dependent variable.
4.1 Estimating store eﬀects
Because investigating precise pricing strategies of retailers is beyond the scope of this paper,
we build an indicator of the relative price for each store in a given year. Our data will include
24We actually use dummies for each d´ epartements, a smaller administrative unit (94 d´ epartements when we
exclude Corsica and overseas territories) than the region (21).23
one observation for each store each year, which solves the issues of dealing with data at product
level. More precisely, for each year t, we consider the following model for the price of a product















+ ys + ηp,s,m
This speciﬁcation above captures seasonal changes potentially aﬀecting the price of each prod-
uct, as well as the type of store.26
We are mainly interested in recovering ys, the “store eﬀects”, for each year. By deﬁnition
E{ηp,s,m|ys} = 0. In order to compute b ys, we must ﬁrst estimate the b α parameters consistently.
Our sample of products consists of items commonly sold in all types of stores. Since the data
used in our study are used by INSEE to compute inﬂation in France, we believe that products
are surveyed using a proper sampling scheme and thus assume that there is no selection bias
in our sample. We therefore use OLS under the assumption of strict exogeneity of ys + ηp,s,m.
The composite structure of the error would normally require robust variance matrix estimators.
However, since we are not interested in inference on α, this is unnecessary here.
Let \ log(Pp,s,m) denote the price predicted value (actually log(price)). Each year and for each
store, we are able to compute an estimate of the store eﬀect by averaging out residuals over
products and months:
b ys = log(Pp,s,m) − \ log(Pp,s,m) = ys + ζs
Our variable of interest ys is thus measured with error ζs, which might create spurious cor-
relation between the price diﬀerences and initial prices. We provide a detailed evaluation of
the magnitude of this bias in Appendix A, and show that store eﬀects seem to be suﬃciently
precisely estimated to consider the bias as negligible.27
25For expositional simplicity, we omit the subscript for time, but, all variables implicitly depend on the year t.
26Diﬀerent speciﬁcations are possible, for instance omitting type dummies. Our results are robust to such
changes.
27Besides, averaging the initial price over three dates in itself also mitigates endogeneity problems.24
4.2 Long-term diﬀerential price increase
Estimating “store eﬀects” allows us to deal with the problems created by unobserved random
shocks at product level. From now on, the store eﬀect is denoted yt
s to emphasize time variation;
it aggregates all the information about the (idiosyncratic) pricing strategy of store s during year
t.
Let us assume that random shocks follow the process εt+1
s = ρεt
s + ξt+1
s , with 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
Ignoring other time varying determinants of store eﬀects, it appears that the variations of store
eﬀects are always correlated with initial levels, and this correlation is relatively larger when the
process is weakly persistent.28 Even in the absence of any structural break generated by the
enactment of the Loi Galland, our regression would conclude to a negative link. In order to deal
with this endogeneity issue, we ﬁrst use the mean b yt
s of store eﬀects computed over the three
years, 1994, 1995 and 1996, to reduce the potential bias. Our simulations tend to show that the
bias may nevertheless still be large when random shocks exhibit little persistence.29
We therefore turn to instrumental variables, using initial local market concentration MCt
s to
instrument initial store price b yt
s. The validity of such an instrument relies on the assumption
that market concentration is strongly correlated with initial price b yt
s but uncorrelated with the
equation residual εt+1
s − εt
s. In other words, we assume that instantaneous unobserved shocks
may translate into price changes but do not aﬀect local market concentration.
Market concentration is computed over a relatively large area surrounding the store, according
to our deﬁnition of local markets. A demand shock aﬀecting a single store within this market is
thus expected to have a much smaller impact on the whole local market.
Agents determine their development strategies according to long-term prospects, rather than
in response to short-term events. Store construction lags is a ﬁrst obvious reason. Furthermore,
barriers to entry are rather important in the French grocery sector (see for instance Bertrand
and Kramarz 2002). Opening a new store or extending an already existing one needs to be
approved by a local commission. Even in case of success, the overall process for opening a
new store generally takes several years. It is thus highly unlikely that market structures should
react to short-term positive demand shocks aﬀecting the local markets. The time span of store
closure is typically smaller than for store openings. However, it generates heavy opportunity
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costs as the ability to open a new store is questionable, given the restrictive regulations on
openings. Besides, the existence of large retail chains is also likely to smooth the consequences
of short-term adverse local shocks. From a practical standpoint, market concentration appears
to be extremely inert in our data. Overall, we thus expect our identiﬁcation condition to hold,
especially in the very case where endogeneity is most likely to be an issue.30
Finally, in order to deal with the potentially diﬀerential impact of macroeconomic or regional
shocks, we always include dummies for each d´ epartement in our regressions.
We run the following regression over the period 1994-1999:
∆b ys = cst + αb ys + βMC.∆MCc(s) | {z }
variation of local
concentration in c(s)
+ βHD.∆HDc(s) | {z }
variation of the share




















where ∆ denotes diﬀerences taken between 1994 and 1999 and b ys is an average of store eﬀects
computed over the three years, 1994, 1995 and 1996. We ﬁrst run an OLS regression using
a robust variance matrix clustered by towns for inference. We then run an OLS regression
of b ys on all exogenous variables, as well as our instrument MCc(s) (market concentration in
1994). Recovering the residual of this ﬁrst stage regression, we then run the ﬁrst OLS regres-
sion, augmented by the residual of the ﬁrst stage regression. This provides a convenient test
of endogeneity, asymptotically equivalent to the Hausman test. This also provides us with the
point estimates of the two-stage least squares and allows us to compare the magnitudes of the
OLS and TSLS estimates.31
Results for the balanced sample of 1348 stores (of all types) across 1994-1999 are presented
in table 7. The results support the prediction that prices have increased more where they were
initially lower. This is the case using both OLS and TSLS. Besides, there is no evidence of
endogeneity of the initial price in the regression, as the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst step residual in
the augmented regression is not signiﬁcant. The eﬀect is slightly more important, even though
less precisely estimated, if we run the same regressions keeping hypermarkets only (see table 8).
30It is in the absence of persistence of shocks (ρ = 0) that the issue of endogeneity is the most troublesome.
31If exogeneity is rejected, it is however important to perform the TSLS in order to get appropriate standard
errors.26
Table 7 : Long term price variations
OLS TSLS Aug. Reg.









∆ Share of Hard Discounts
-0.125 -0.175 -0.175
(0.098) (0.108) (0.107)
Catchment Area Speciﬁcs Y Y Y
Regional Dummies Y Y Y
Type Dummies Y Y Y
R2 0.11 0.04 0.11
Number of obs. 1348 1348 1348
Note: Robust variance estimators clustered by towns. In parenthesis: standard errors. 3, 2 and 1 stars
respectively mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Not reported : log(population),
log(income), dummies by d´ epartement and dummies by type. Sources : INSEE (IPC,CENSUS), LSA. In
the TSLS and in the augmented regressions, initial average individual eﬀects are instrumented by “5/10/20”
market concentration indices.
Table 8 : Long term price variations
Hypermarkets only
OLS TSLS Aug. Reg.









∆ Share of Hard Discounts
-0.228∗∗ -0.217∗ -0.217∗
(0.116) (0.114) (0.113)
Catchment Area Speciﬁcs Y Y Y
Regional Dummies Y Y Y
R2 0.30 0.27 0.30
Number of obs. 322 322 322
Note: Robust variance estimators clustered by towns. In parenthesis: standard errors. 3, 2 and 1 stars
respectively mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Not reported : log(population),
log(income), dummies by d´ epartement and dummies by type. Sources : INSEE (IPC,CENSUS), LSA. In
the TSLS and in the augmented regressions, initial average individual eﬀects are instrumented by “5/10/20”
market concentration indices.27
5 Conclusion
Using a unique dataset on retail prices of a large number of products, collected in a large
and representative sample of grocery stores, this paper provides a ﬁrst empirical evaluation of
the eﬀects of the 1996 below-cost pricing regulations (Loi Galland). More precisely, we show
that there is strong evidence to support the claim that the Loi Galland eﬀectively led to the
elimination of (or at least an important reduction in) intrabrand competition. This could, at
least partially, explain the sharp increase in prices of groceries that occurred after 1997. We
provide two diﬀerent tests of our theoretical predictions. Firstly, in the spirit of the empirical
literature linking prices to market structure, we look at the correlation between retail prices
and the level of concentration on the various local markets. We ﬁnd that retail prices were
initially signiﬁcantly lower in less concentrated markets. The magnitude of the correlation is
also consistent with previous analysis conducted on the same sector in other European countries.
Two years after the enactment of the new legislation, the correlation has however vanished
conﬁrming that retail chains are no longer competing ﬁercely. We then provide a second (more
direct) test, estimating individual store eﬀects and observing that prices were increasing more
in stores that were initially lower.
It should however be noted that this paper does not provide a complete evaluation of the
eﬀects of the Loi Galland. For instance, although our results support the claims that it was
responsible for (at least part) of the price increase that occurred after 1997, there might have
been other eﬀects on the lines of products carried, or on the quality of services provided by
retailers. Moreover, one of the reasons to introduce the legislation was to level the playing ﬁeld
between small businesses and large retail chains. The Galland Act might have partly achieved
this role, by ﬁlling a part of the price disadvantages of small village shops. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that this eﬀect was probably rather limited (see Commission Canivet 2005).
Many convenience stores that were previously independent are now part of retail chains (either
because they have been taken over by these chains or because they joined them as franchisees).32
Moreover, it does not seem that the rate of closure of independent specialized shops such as
butchers, ﬁshmongers or bakeries has slowed down after 1997. One lesson from economic theory
is that a problem is more eﬃciently solved by addressing directly the issue. Price regulations
are thus unlikely to constitute the best policy to help the few remaining rural shops or the
independent specialized retailers.
32Less than 15% of small grocery retailers are independent.References
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As stated in section 4, we use estimated values of ys in our regression. We thus measure ys with







xp,s,m(β − b β) + ηp,s,m
i
The ﬁrst part in the error term is the consequence of the estimation of β. The variance of the
estimator b β being proportional to the inverse of the size of the overall sample, β is very precisely
estimated given the size of our dataset. We thus neglect the ﬁrst part of the error term.
The second part is the average of all the error terms, which are all zero-mean conditional on
xp,s,m and ys. Our estimator of ys, b ys, is therefore unbiased.
However, since we compute diﬀerences of the estimated eﬀects , this second error term still
generates a bias in our regressions. Instead of regressing y1999
s −y1994
s on y1994−96
s , we do the re-





















































Calculating the bias created by the error requires estimating the variance of ζs. Assuming
that ηp,s,m are uncorrelated and homoscedastic, it is possible to get an estimator of V ar(η)
using the within store estimator corresponding to ﬁxed eﬀect method. Given that our sample is
unbalanced, we need to correct for the heteroscedasticity created by the diﬀerence in the number
of observations for each store. If b ξp,s,m is the residual of the within store estimator, an estimator
33For the sake of simplicity, we compute the bias in the absence of other explanatory variables. In the complete
case, it would be necessary to apply the Frisch-Waugh theorem and to project all variables on the orthogonal of
the other variables.of V ar(η) is:






















This in turn implies that:















The bias created by the ﬁrst step is thus negligible when ηp,s,m are uncorrelated and ho-
moscedastic.
This last assumption may however fail to hold. For instance, due to product complementarity,
for a given store in a given month, ηp,s,m may be negatively correlated. Besides, for a given
product in a store, ηp,s,m may also be correlated, either positively if the pricing strategy is
stable over time (e.g., “every day low price” policy for some products), or negatively when this
pricing strategy evolves regularly (e.g., “high-low” or sales strategies). The variance matrix
of ηp,s,m may then be very hard to specify. Our estimator of the variance of ζs may then
underestimate the noise (if there is important positive correlation), or alternatively overestimate
it (if there is massive negative correlation). Instruments are a general method to deal with such
measurement errors. The instrument we use in our estimation (initial concentration) is assumed
to be uncorrelated with short-term demand shocks. We assume that the residuals of prices,
ηp,s,m, once we control for types of products and stores and time invariant heterogeneity (by
time invariant, we hereby mean within a year), are not correlated with initial concentration.
This assumption would be violated if, for instance, some types of products were only surveyed
in very competitive stores, or if some products were more often used as loss leaders in very
competitive stores. However, if it holds, the instrumentation of our main regression also solves
the issues created by the use of estimated values from the ﬁrst step.G 9001  J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY 
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